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Sustainable Debt and Poverty 
Reduction: The Nexus
Developing countries and the international aid community have long been aware 
that the growing debt levels of poor countries impede development and perpetu-
ate poverty. In past decades, the most heavily indebted poor countries have spent 
more on debt service than on health and education combined1. While debt relief 
initiatives have alleviated debt burdens in recent years, weak macroeconomic 
fundamentals, the global economic and financial crisis and the growing acces-
sibility of non-concessional financing2 from the market or from non-traditional 
donors risk propelling debt levels back into the danger zone unless proactive 
measures are taken.
Established in 1964, the African Development Bank (ADB) Group is 
a regional multilateral development bank whose mission is to help reduce 
poverty, improve living conditions for Africans and mobilize resources for 
Africa’s economic and social development. The ADB Group comprises both 
the ADB and the African Development Fund (ADF). The ADF’s main objec-
tive is to give low-income regional member countries (RMCs) access to con-
cessional loans and grants for poverty-reducing projects and programs and 
to provide them with technical assistance for studies and capacity-building 
activities.
An important part of the ADF’s work consists of assisting African low-
income countries to strengthen the sustainability of their debt. Working 
with a host of international and country-level partners, the ADF has helped 
RMCs exit from or avoid debt distress, build their debt-management capac-
ity, and access financing for development programs at concessional rather 
than commercial rates. In 2009, the ADF enhanced this agenda with new 
policies and procedures. The present publication discusses the state of 
Africa’s debt, explores issues regarding debt sustainability, and details the 
actions taken by the ADF and its partners to ensure that in future, Africa’s 
debt does not impede but rather enables countries to achieve national devel- countries to achieve national devel- achieve national devel-
opment goals.3
Debt Relief: Is It Enough?
Toward the middle of the 1990s, social and economic problems associated 
with developing countries’ growing levels of national debt were provoking 
mounting calls for creditors to forgive all or part of their loans. In 1996, the 
international aid community responded by launching the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative, a debt relief program designed to reduce 
the external debt burdens of the most heavily indebted poor countries to 
sustainable levels. In 2005, the HIPC Initiative was supplemented by the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), under which the IMF, the World 
Bank, and the ADF provide 100 percent relief on the eligible debts of African 
countries completing the HIPC Initiative process.
As of mid-2009, 21 low-income African countries had reached the HIPC 
completion point (table 1). The completion point is the point at which a coun-
try has implemented the policy reforms required by IMF and World Bank-
supported programs in order to qualify for full debt relief under the HIPC 
Initiative and the MDRI. Another nine countries had reached the decision 
point—meaning that they had started undertaking reforms and developed 
national poverty reduction and development plans—and became eligible for 
interim relief of up to 40% in most cases.
By end-2008, the total estimated cost of debt relief for all eligible HIPCs 
(33 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa) was US$ 74.4 billion—more than six 
times the US$ 12.2 billion estimated in 1997. Of this amount, US$ 5.3 bil-
lion corresponded to debt owed to the ADB Group. By end-July 2009, US$ 
2.5 billion in relief of ADB Group-held debt had been provided to comple-
tion and decision-point HIPCs. In addition, the ADB Group had provided 
US$ 575.41 million in arrears clearances to be computed as debt relief once 
the recipients reached the HIPC completion point. Arrears clearances are a 
pre-requisite for debt relief eligibility.
As a result of the debt relief provided by the ADB Group and other 
donors, the debt burden of Africa’s completion point HIPCs has dropped by 4  Balancing Debt and Development
80 percent on average compared to decision-point levels. Lower debt burdens 
have not only translated into lower debt distress risk, they have permitted 
these HIPCs to increase spending on poverty reduction commensurately.
But 11 of 21 completion point countries in Africa still have a moderate 
or high risk of debt distress after receiving debt relief, and even though seven 
new countries reached the completion point between 2005 and 2009, the 
number of countries ranked with a low risk of debt distress did not rise. The 
situation is alarming for decision point countries as well: even after receiv-
ing interim relief, all new countries in this category remain at high risk of 
debt distress. Overall, the number of ADF countries3 in actual debt distress 
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or in high or moderate risk of debt distress rose between 2005 and 2009 
(graph 1).
These figures confirm that while debt relief initiatives have succeeded at 
reducing countries’ stock of debt and freeing fiscal space for poverty-reducing 
expenditures, many African low-income countries remain vulnerable to fast-
deteriorating debt positions due to their re-accumulation of debt faster than 
supported by the growth of their gross domestic product and exports or due 
to their vulnerability to external shocks. The deterioration of the debt dis-
tress risk of Ghana, a relatively strong post-completion point performer, in 
the second half of 2008 illustrates this vulnerability. Ghana’s reclassification 
from low to moderate risk of distress resulted from its rapid accumulation of 
external and domestic public debt contracted on commercial terms, and high 
current account and fiscal deficits that expose it to structural vulnerabilities 
in the event of a reversal of favorable terms of trade.
As for the HIPCs that retained a high risk of debt distress even after 
reaching the HIPC completion point—Burundi, the Gambia, Rwanda, and 
São Tomé & Principe—part of the explanation lies in these countries’ low 
export base, the poor or deteriorating quality of their policies and institu-
tions, and the fact that their concentration in a small number of commodities 
increases their sensitivity to shocks such as droughts and price volatility.
A recent shock that has affected the economic fundamentals of many 
HIPCs is the global financial and economic crisis. It is still too early to pre-
dict the long-term impacts of the sharp declines in exports, falling gross 
domestic product, reductions in remittances, and decreases in foreign direct 
investment and trade. It is evident, however, that the crisis could worsen 
debt ratios and curtail governments’ ability to maintain prudent risk levels 
while implementing counter-cyclical measures. Indeed, recent studies by the 























































































Completion Point Decision Point Pre-Decision Point Non-HIPC
High risk  Moderate risk  Low risk
GRaPh 1 
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crisis could pose serious risks, particularly for low-income countries that are 
already struggling under a high debt burden.4 For example, IMF debt simu-
lations show that if a 30% reduction in aid and foreign direct investments is 
replaced by external borrowing to maintain investment expenditures, three 
ADF countries currently at low or moderate risk of debt distress (including 
two that have reached the HIPC completion point) could fall back into a 
high risk of debt distress (table 2).5
Even independently of crisis-related borrowing, however, analyses show 
that for many post-MDRI countries, debt ratios will converge to pre-MDRI 
levels in the long term unless macroeconomic fundamentals improve.6 In 
other words, even after HPIC and MDRI debt relief, beneficiary countries 
still require substantial concessional resources to keep their debt sustainable. 
The fact that debt relief alone is insufficient to ensure long-term debt sustain-
ability was emphasized in the Monterrey Consensus of 2002, which called 
for (i) comprehensive strategies for reducing the vulnerability of debtor coun-
tries; (ii) shared debtor/creditor responsibility for preventing and resolving 
unsustainable debt situations; and (iii) strengthened technical assistance for 
debt management and debt tracking. The global crisis has made these mea-
sures more necessary than ever.
Table 2 
IMF Simulation of the Impact of the Crisis on Risk of Debt Distress 
Classifications
Risk of debt distress
low Moderate high In distress
Cameroon angola burkina burundi
Cape verde benin Central african 
Republic
Comoros




Madagascar ethiopia Côte d’Ivoire Guinea
Mali Ghana Djibouti Guinea-bissau
Mozambique lesotho Gambia liberia
Nigeria Malawi lesotho Sudan
Senegal Mauritania Mozambique Togo





The ADF and the Debt 
Sustainability Framework
In accordance with the Monterrey Consensus and with a view to helping 
low-income countries balance debt levels with their need for financing, in 
2004 the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in consultation 
with the ADF, designed a comprehensive, internationally prescribed instru-
ment: the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF). The DSF acts as a comple-
ment to the HIPC Initiative and the MDRI and consists of a common donor 
approach to the challenges of debt distress and the re-accumulation of non-
concessional debt by HIPCs. Since its adoption by the ADF in 2005, the 
DSF has informed the terms of ADF financing, including grant eligibility, 
and has framed the ADF’s broader dialogue with low-income countries and 
development partners.
The DSF analyzes countries’ debt sustainability using debt sustainabil-
ity analyses (DSAs). DSAs guide low-income countries’ borrowing practices 
so that countries match their financing decisions to their current and pro-
spective repayment abilities. They also inform creditors’ lending and grant-
allocation decisions to ensure that resources are provided on terms that are 
consistent with low-income countries’ development goals and their long-term 
debt sustainability. In addition, they inform policy and help to detect poten-
tial crises early so that preventive action can be taken.
The DSF was originally built on two pillars. The “static” pillar is based 
on a 1-year snapshot of debt indicators relative to external debt burden 
thresholds that took country policies and institutions into account. Under 
the “dynamic” pillar, the risk of debt distress is assessed in light of forward-
looking scenarios. In 2005 and 2006, debt distress risk ratings were primarily 
based on the static pillar, due to the early stage of the framework’s implemen-
tation. Since 2007, DSAs have been regularly conducted using the dynamic 
pillar.7
Currently, DSAs consist of three elements: (i) an analysis of a country’s 
projected debt burden over the next 20 years and its vulnerability to external 8  Balancing Debt and Development
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latest DSa discussion 
by IMF board (DSa 
not yet published)
angola 25-Oct-07 Moderate 27-Mar-09
benin 12-aug-09 Moderate …
burkina 30-Jul-08 high …
burundi 10-Mar-09 high Yes …
Cameroon 12-aug-08 low 2-Jul-09
Cape Verde 16-Jan-09 low …
Central african 
Rep.
19-aug-09 Moderate Yes …
Chad 23-Feb-09 Moderate …
Comoros 2-Nov-09 In distress …
Congo, Rep. of 21-Jul-09 high …
Côte d’Ivoire 18-Jun-09 high Yes …
Djibouti 21-Jul-09 high  
D. Rep. Congo 24-Sep-07 In distress …
eritrea … high 21-apr-08
ethiopia 23-Sep-09 Moderate …
Gambia 10-Mar-09 high  
Ghana 14-aug-09 Moderate …
Guinea 25-Jan-08 In distress …
Guinea-bissau 31-Jul-09 In distress …
Kenya 18-Jun-09 low …
lesotho 21-apr-08 Moderate 9-Feb-09
liberia 8-Jun-09 In distress Yes …
Madagascar 16-Jul-08 low …
Malawi 4-Jan-08 Moderate …
Mali 14-aug-08 low …
Mauritania 16-Jul-08 Moderate …
Mozambique 30-Jul-09 low …
Niger 18-Feb-09 Moderate …
Nigeria 14-Feb-08 low …
Rwanda 20-aug-09 Moderate …
São Tomé & 
Príncipe
12-Feb-09 high  
Senegal 9-Jul-09 low …
Sierra leone 25-Jul-08 Moderate …
Somalia … high …
Sudan 11-Oct-07 In distress 26-Nov-08
Tanzania 5-Jun-09 low …
Togo 7-Nov-08 In distress Yes …
Uganda 5-Mar-09 low  
Zambia 30-Jan-08 low …
Zimbabwe 5/11/2009 In distress    
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and policy shocks, with baseline and shock scenarios; (ii) an assessment of the 
risk of debt distress during that time, based on indicative debt burden thresh-
olds that depend on the country’s policies and the quality of its institutions; 
and (iii) recommendations for a borrowing (and lending) strategy that limits 
the risk of debt distress.8
As of end-July 2009, 38 of 40 ADF-eligible countries had been assessed at 
least once with forward-looking DSAs (table 3).9 DSAs are usually reviewed 
at least once a year. The ADB has contributed to the rating process since 
2006.
Under the ADF’s Performance-Based Allocation system, the ADF uses 
DSAs to classify countries into three “traffic light” categories, where red indi-
cates a high risk of debt distress, yellow indicates a moderate risk, and green 
indicates a low risk. Countries in the red category qualify for 100 percent 
grants, countries in the green category qualify for 100 percent loans, and 
countries in the yellow category qualify for a 50/50 loan/grant combination. 
ADF loans are highly concessional with a 50 year maturity, a 10 year grace 
period and a 0.75 percent interest rate (also called service charge). Over the 
past 5 years, the number of grant-eligible countries (red and yellow countries, 
i.e., countries in high and medium risk of debt distress) has remained rela-
tively stable, varying between 24 and 27 (graph 2).10
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Although the DSF has helped reduce the debt stock of countries with a 
medium or high risk of debt distress by encouraging donors to provide more 
grants and concessional resources, many ADF countries continue to face very 
difficult budgetary choices. The amount of grants and concessional loans 
that these countries can access is far below the amount they need for their 
development. Meanwhile, an increasing number of non-traditional donors 
are offering large volumes of loans on non-concessional terms, and countries 
at low risk of debt distress and with a relatively good credit standing are 
tempted to go the market.
In response to this challenge, the ADF adopted its Policy on Non-Con-
cessional Debt Accumulation in May 2008. Known as the Non-Concessional 
Borrowing Policy, or NCBP, this policy is designed to enhance creditor coor-
dination around the DSF and discourage non-concessional borrowing by 
means of disincentives for recipient countries, including reductions in financ-
ing volumes and harder borrowing terms.
The ADF’s adoption of the NCBP is rooted in the fact that the provi-
sion of grants and debt relief to eligible countries is intended to help bring 
their debt to sustainable levels and create fiscal space for priority development 
expenditures. Beneficiaries’ accumulation of new debt on non-concessional 
terms, whether from public or private sources, can undermine these objec-
tives and introduce free-riding, a situation in which the grants and debt relief 
provided by one or more parties cross-subsidize new borrowing from third-
party lenders on non-concessional terms. This risk is particularly high in 
resource-rich countries where non-concessional borrowing can be secured by 
future export receipts.
To reduce the risk of free-riding, it is essential that donors adopt a col-
lective approach to debt re-accumulation. The NCBP is therefore closely har-
monized in both design and implementation to the IDA’s approach11 and the 
IMF’s policy on concessionality.12 It is also committed to methods that are 
Doing More to Keep 
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effective and possible to implement, and to a flexible, case-by-case approach. 
The NCBP is based on the following methods:
Strengthening partnerships and coordination with sister multilateral  i. 
development banks and bilateral agencies to adopt a common strat-
egy in dealing with the problem, including advocacy;
Reinforcing reporting and monitoring through the creation of a non- ii. 
concessional borrowing monitoring committee and the insertion of 
a clause in all ADB Group grant/loan agreements that requires bor-
rowers to report all planned and new non-concessional borrowing;
Enhancing cooperation with regards to capacity building in collabo- iii. 
ration with other partners; and
Applying disincentives. iv. 
With respect to this last point, the ADF has established a flexible set of 
volume reductions and hardened terms that allow it to make case-by-case 
decisions about RMCs that breach the NCBP. Hardened terms consist of 
shorter maturity and grace periods and/or higher interest rates that reduce the 
grant element or the concessionality of ADF loans.13 The hardest terms are 
applied to resource-rich RMCs that consistently borrow on non-concessional 
terms. For emerging market low-income, low-risk RMCs in which capital 
bOx 1 
NCBP Disincentive Measures in Ghana
Ghana’s non-concessional borrowing in 2007 
consisted of (i) a US$ 750 million Eurobond issued 
on capital markets at a fixed coupon of 8.5 percent 
and a 10-year repayment of the principal; (ii) a US$ 
292 million loan agreement with the Export-Import 
Bank of China for the Bui hydroelectric power plant 
subject to 6.1 percent interest, a 17-year repayment 
period, and a 5-year grace period; and (iii) a US$ 
23.5 million loan from the Netherlands BMH Bank 
for the Barekese Water Supply Project.
The ADF assessed Ghana’s non-concessional 
borrowing in light of sector and country-specific 
circumstances. Approved in 2005, Ghana’s Growth 
and Poverty Reduction Strategy had noted the 
insufficiency of domestic and concessional sources 
to finance the country’s development plan, particu-
larly as regarded energy and transport. To facili-
tate these investments, Ghana undertook policy 
and institutional reforms such as electricity tariff 
readjustments, public enterprise modernization and 
the creation of a Project Finance Analysis Unit to 
monitor and evaluate new investment projects. Part 
of the Eurobond proceeds and financing arrange-
ments with the Export-Import Bank of China were 
planned for energy investments to keep up with 
the growth in demand and mitigate the country’s 
vulnerability to drought-induced power supply 
disruptions.
A joint IMF-World Bank DSA conducted in 
April 2007 had incorporated some non-concessional 
borrowing into the baseline scenario, but not to the 
magnitude and extent eventually contracted. A more 
recent IMF-World Bank DSA undertaken in June 
2008 classified Ghana at a moderate risk of debt dis-
tress, which status represented a slight deterioration 
compared to the previous rating. This deterioration 
was due to the rapid accumulation of external public 
debt contracted on commercial terms and high cur-
rent account and fiscal deficits.
In view of Ghana’s increased access to capital 
market financing, and given Ghana’s Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating and 
green light status, ADF Management decided to 
apply moderate ADF terms to Ghana. These trans-
lated into a reduction of the maturity period of ADF 
loans from 50 to 40 years.14 All other terms remain 
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markets have shown interest in financing projects, the ADF accommodates 
some non-concessional borrowing in recognition that these loans will help 
countries reach the Millennium Development Goals. Finally, for HIPCs in 
the interim period, the ADF’s grant agreements include a clause to the effect 
that the borrower will not receive extended interim debt relief if it contracts 
non-concessional debt during the interim period. An internal cross-depart-
mental NCBP committee reviews issues as they arise.
The ADF has only applied disincentive measures once since the NCBP 
was adopted. This took place in Ghana (box 1).15 Three other ADF coun-
tries—Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia—were reportedly considering raising 
capital through the Eurobond market in 2008, but for economic reasons, 
these projects were not completed. The extension of a large non-concessional 
loan to the Democratic Republic of Congo by Chinese entities is also being 
closely monitored, but the decision depends on the conclusion of discus-
sions between the ADF, the IMF and the IDA on one hand and Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo authorities on the other, with regard to reducing 
the amount of the debt and increasing its concessionality.15
Implementing the NCBP has drawn attention to several challenges:
The lack of data on debts contracted with commercial and non-tra- •	
ditional donors that do not participate in donor reporting systems, 
as is the case of China in the Democratic Republic of Congo, slows 
or prevents the ADF’s analysis of low-income countries’ non-conces-
sional borrowing and inhibits its implementation of the NCBP.
The IDA’s experience in Angola suggests that in resource-rich coun- •	
tries that have the possibility of borrowing several times the amount 
of concessional resources available to them, the NCBP’s ability to 
deter non-concessional borrowing will be limited. In these cases, tra-
ditional donors will play a key role in helping countries to strengthen 
their debt management capacity.
It is difficult to determine the right type and amount of disincentive  •	
to apply, particularly for low-risk, well-performing countries with 
access to non-concessional financing (including capital markets) to 
finance their development needs in the absence of sufficient conces-
sional financing.
As a consequence of these challenges, both donors and ADF countries 
have suggested that the NCBP be revised to allow for more country-specific 
conditions and greater flexibility. This suggestion echoes a G20 request made 
in April 2009 that the IMF and the World Bank review the flexibility of 
the DSF.16 The goal of the review was to implement measures that offset the 
impact of external shocks and/or finance certain public investments whose 
strong growth impacts can be demonstrated, while protecting the debt sus-
tainability of developing countries.
In close collaboration with the ADB, the IMF and the World Bank there-
fore reviewed the DSF and proposed adjustments that were approved by the 
World Bank and IMF Boards of Directors on 27 and 31 August 2009.17 All 
of the adjustments were designed to increase the accuracy of the DSF without 
Revising the DSF and the NCBP:   
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jeopardizing debt sustainability. Accordingly, DSAs will do more to consider 
the link between public investments and growth; will be more flexible in 
interpreting the influence of remittances on the risk of debt distress; and 
will introduce greater inertia in the ratings used to determine debt distress 
thresholds, so as to avoid cases where the deterioration of a country’s rating 
to just below the applicable boundary in a given year leads to the immediate 
application of a lower debt distress threshold.18 The changes, which will be 
implemented in 2010, also mandate that new DSAs better reflect the views 
of country authorities and be more flexible in their treatment of the debt of 
public enterprises when such debt does not confront governments with sig-
nificant fiscal risk.
Also in August 2009, the Board of Directors of the IMF approved a 
new matrix to determine concessionality limits for low-income countries.19 
Instead of the previous one-size-fits-all approach, non-concessional debt 
accumulation rules now vary according to the country’s debt vulnerability, its 
macroeconomics, its debt management capacity, and the qualitative assess-
ments of IMF staff. Once a country is classified using the new matrix, the 
IMF defines appropriate debt limits: minimum concessionality requirements 
with non-zero limits on non-concessional borrowings if appropriate; pres-
ent value targets or average concessionality requirements for countries with 
higher capacity; and, for the most advanced low-income countries meeting 
certain criteria, the complete elimination of concessionality requirements. 
The IMF expects to complete its first set of ratings by end-2009.
As regards the review of the ADB’s debt re-accumulation instrument (the 
NCBP), the ADB will collaborate closely with the IDA and the IMF in order 
to ensure that the three institutions maintain a coordinated approach to the 
accumulation of non-concessional debt, thus continuing to leverage collec-
tive donor action. In consideration of the ADB’s continental mandate, special 
attention will be paid to concerns specific to African low-income countries.17
Although circumstances are worsening as a result of the global financial cri-
sis, many ADF countries are in a much better fiscal situation than they were 
pre-debt relief, thanks to the HIPC Initiative, the MDRI, and the use of the 
DSF by several major multilateral donors to determine the conditions of their 
financial assistance. Despite the positive results of debt-related initiatives, 
however, there is ample evidence of a great need for debt management capac-
ity building to help countries reap the benefits of debt relief and avoid falling 
back into debt distress. Of Africa’s 40 ADF countries, 23 (58 percent) have a 
poor or medium rating on the debt policy component of the CPIA.
Countries’ need for strong debt management capacity is reinforced 
by the fact that with the great majority of countries expected to reach the 
completion point in coming years, the HIPC Initiative and the MDRI will 
be winding down, causing the international community to turn its focus 
to the issue of debt management: developing strong and sustainable debt 
strategies and debt management instruments, especially in the wake of the 
diversification and increasing complexity of financing products available to 
low-income countries from traditional and non-traditional donors. Capacity 
will also play a key role in defining acceptable non-concessional borrowing 
levels for low-income countries under the IMF’s new concessionality limits 
matrix.
Under its Governance Strategic Directions and Action Plan for 2008–
2012, the ADB Group has scaled up its support to ADF countries as regards 
debt management capacity building. As a result, most of the ADF’s gover-
nance projects now include components of public financial management 
reform. In this regard, the ADF has worked either directly or through 
regional intermediaries such as Africa Regional Technical Assistance Cen-
ters, the West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management, 
the Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institution of Eastern and 
Southern Africa, and regional economic commissions such as the Common 
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Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union.
In implementing debt management strategies, the ADB considers it 
essential that debt management be considered in the broader context of the 
sound management of public resources in general and revenue policies in par-
ticular, specifically with respect to taxes, debt and aid. Measures to enlarge 
fiscal space include tools other than debt: for example, enhancing domestic 
revenues (both tax and non-tax revenues, especially in resource-rich coun-
tries), which are often deficient in low-income countries; rationalizing public 
expenditures and making them more effective and efficient; and developing 
donor engagement strategies to secure the predictable delivery of aid commit-
ments. The ADF approaches debt management capacity building as part of a 
broader agenda in support of good financial governance, including the devel-
opment of effective and efficient tax policy and administration frameworks, 
anti-corruption measures and domestic revenue mobilization.
An important international initiative in the area of debt management 
capacity is the recently created Debt Management Facility (DMF). The DMF 
was set up after the HIPC conference of October 2008 to scale up capacity 
building for debt management in a coordinated manner, with Africa’s main 
technical assistance providers acting as implementing partners.20 Admin-
istered by the World Bank, the DMF addresses debt assessment, program 
design, technical assistance for the development of debt management strate-
gies, monitoring, knowledge dissemination, and training. Initial financing 
bOx 2 
Capacity Building for Debt Management: 
The ADB in Action
When RMCs identify a significant concern regard-
ing their capacity to manage debt, the ADB works 
with them to design appropriate policy reforms 
and capacity-strengthening initiatives. Institu-
tional support projects (ISPs) to build capacity for 
debt management are currently taking place in the 
Central African Republic, Burundi, Comoros, 
the Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
Typically, ADB support entails technical assistance, 
the strengthening of the legal/institutional frame-
work for debt management, computerization and 
training. The ADB is also working with RMCs to 
strengthen capacity for debt management as part of 
broader economic and financial governance reforms 
supported through policy-based loans (typically, debt 
management is included in the government’s overall 
performance assessment framework). More recently, 
specific policy-based loan programs were being 
designed to address specific debt management issues, 
such as the enablement of debt restructuring.
One ISP that is demonstrating measurable results 
in achieving debt management capacity building is 
taking place in Sierra Leone. The Bank is assisting 
Sierra Leone’s Public Debt Management Unit in 
a two-phase project that has supplied professional 
staff and provided training to support HIPC trigger 
monitoring until the completion point and DSA. 
The project also provided technical input for Paris 
Club bilateral negotiations. The project is now in its 
second phase, that of financing critical activities to 
meet best practices. These activities include the for-
mulation of comprehensive national legislation for 
debt management, the production of a procedural 
manual and the integration of debt management 
software. The reforms implemented under the ISP 
have helped Sierra Leone’s CPIA debt management 
rating rise from 2.9 out of 6 in 2001 to 3.5 out of 6 
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was received from several donors and Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Nether-
lands, Norway and Switzerland are current contributors.
In consideration of the DMF’s central coordination and harmonization 
role in the debt management capacity-building area, the ADB Group decided 
in 2009 to become a donor to and key partner of the DMF. Participating in 
the initiative will allow the ADB to contribute to debt management capacity-
building activities in Africa while continuing to strengthen its own abilities 
to support debt management reform and build capacity for financing pro-
grams in ADF countries in a more systematic and strategic manner. This will 
be particularly helpful in fragile states, which tend to have the lowest debt 
management capacity and the highest debt vulnerability.21
Most ADF countries have many financing partners, including in some cases 
the providers of non-concessional financing. Actions to support debt sustain-
ability, such as the DSF, can only have a significant impact if a critical mass 
of donors embraces a coordinated approach. The DSF is currently used by 
the Bretton Woods Institutions, the ADB Group, the Asian Development 
Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. The ADF 
and these institutions collaborate actively to improve the DSF; perfect its 
implementation; render the DSF more easily understandable by low-income 
countries; and increase its use by bilateral donors, commercial creditors and 
others.
Since 2007, ADB Country Teams have provided systematic inputs into 
the DSF and have participated in selected DSA missions with Bretton Woods 
Institutions staff. ADB teams also collaborate systematically on HIPC, 
MDRI and NCBP issues, both at the country implementation level and dur-
ing regular updates of the overall framework.
The ADF also participates regularly in donor and recipient roundtables 
and other fora on debt sustainability, where it is increasingly visible as the 
continent’s voice and honest broker. Within ADF countries, debt sustainabil-
ity and management issues are being raised in an increasingly coordinated 
manner in joint donor thematic groups or as part of multidonor/borrower 
dialogues for budget support operations.
A key forum for discussing and coordinating debt management issues is 
the international financial institutions’ annual meetings on debt issues. The 
ADF is a regular participant (box 3).
The ADF’s participation in these meetings and in the DMF are part of its 
strategy to significantly scale up its collaboration and coordination on debt 
issues with African low-income countries, the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
bilateral donors to the DMF and the main sub-regional debt management 
capacity-building organizations that act as DMF implementing partners. For 
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example, the ADB will host the DMF’s first Stakeholder Forum in Tunis in 
the first quarter of 2010 to discuss the impact of the crisis on debt sustain-
ability with the continent’s debt managers and their partners from the donor 
community.
Finally, the ADB Group has assumed a lead role in coordinating efforts 
to support African governments in debt recovery litigation issues, which have 
become particularly prominent in the context of HIPC/MDRI debt relief. 
The African Legal Support Facility (ALSF) was launched in 2009 to enhance 
RMCs’ access to sound technical legal advice when dealing with debt recov-
ery lawsuits by vulture funds. The facility supplies resources, has created a 
knowledge database, and conducts capacity building activities such as train-
ing in the debtor country.
bOx 3 
The International Financial 
Institutions’ Meetings on Debt 
Issues
The international financial institutions’ annual 
meetings on debt issues gather representatives from 
international financial institutions and observers 
from bilateral creditors (nine international financial 
institutions and two bilateral creditors in 2009) to 
exchange experiences and discuss issues pertaining 
to debt sustainability and debt management. The 
meeting is a key forum for increasing coordination 
on several issues:
Increasing challenges in structuring arrears  •	
clearance for pre-decision point countries;
Countries’ HIPC and MDRI implementation  •	
status and some countries’ difficulty in reaching 
the completion point;
Grandfathering of new countries into the HIPC  •	
Initiative framework;
Non-concessional borrowing by HIPCs; •	
Commercial debt; •	
Implementation and possible changes to the DSF; •	
Debt management capacity building and tech- •	
nical assistance in low-income countries; and
The impact of the global crisis on debt sustain- •	
ability trends.
Participants share their experience and discuss 
new proposals and initiatives. The meeting is also an 
occasion to discuss new research on debt management 
issues and adopt common strategies where possible.23
The global financial crisis has spotlighted borrowers’ and donors’ need to 
strengthen their response to debt management and debt sustainability in 
Africa. In the absence of sufficient concessional resources, many African low-
income countries face difficult trade-offs between short-term financial needs 
and sustainable long-term debt. The credit crunch is changing the nature and 
the terms of the debt available on the market, and low-income countries must 
weigh new options in a changing environment.
It has become clear that, post-HIPC and MDRI debt relief, the main 
issue for both borrowers and donors will be low-income countries’ capacity to 
manage their debt at sustainable levels. Good capacity in this regard is vital 
if low-income countries are to realize the full benefits of debt relief and avoid 
falling back into debt distress.
To respond to this challenge, the ADB Group is growing its capacity 
and interventions in the debt management field. In addition to the ADF’s 
fast-growing support for capacity building as regards economic and financial 
governance, the ADB has become a donor to the newly created, multidonor 
Debt Management Facility and is scaling up its cooperation both with its 
traditional partners and with new donors in this regard.
Besides sound debt management strategies, long-term debt sustainabil-
ity also rests on low-income countries’ access to larger volumes of conces-
sional financing. The ADF has been instrumental in this regard. In recent 
years, the ADF has provided substantial amount of resources for debt relief 
operations, thus allowing countries to redirect resources to poverty-reducing 
and growth-generating priorities. It has also significantly increased its over-
all commitments to low-income countries and catalyzed public and private 
investments to an unprecedented degree, leveraging an average of US$ 5 for 
every US$ 1 it invested in cofinanced projects between 2002 and 2008. In 
addition, the ADF has focused its interventions on sectors that are key to 
long-term economic growth.
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With these actions, the ADB Group is helping African low-income coun-
tries to engage with development partners on terms that will enhance and not 
undermine their development. With the collaboration of its partners around 
the world, the ADB and the ADF will continue to pursue debt sustainabil-
ity programs and other measures with a view to fostering Africa’s economic 
progress and facilitating the continent’s pursuit of its potential.25
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